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Non-technical Summary
This study analyses the dollar exposure of large German companies, i.e. value change of
companies associated with changes of the price of the US dollar, and the determinants of
this exposure over the period 1977 - 1995. Movements of exchange rates represent an
important risk factor for companies involved in foreign trade either as importer or as
exporter of goods and services. This is of particular importance for Germany where
shares of exports and imports in GDP are relatively high compared to those of other
countries.
According to conventional wisdom, German companies should benefit from a rising price
of the US dollar as the German economy is perceived as rather export-oriented. This
notion is supported by the fact that during most of the 1980s and 1990s Germany had
quite a significant surplus in its trade balance. Thus, the stock market price of a German
company should rise along rising prices of the US dollar, as the company receives higher
sales revenues from its exports measured in the local German currency (i.e., the German
mark before the introduction of the euro at the beginning of 1999 and the euro thereafter).
However, empirical results are not as clear cut as expected. This study presents
estimation of exchange rate exposure of 28 large German DAX companies for the rather
long time period 1977 to 1995. The relationship turns out to be unstable over time. It is
positive during most of the time span under consideration, but negative in the first half of
the 1980s.
Looking at explanatory factors, it turns out that exchange rate exposure is positively
affected by the relation exports/GDP and negatively affected by the relation
imports/GDP. The first finding confirms the expected result that the export-oriented
German economy should benefit from a rising price of the US dollar. However, in times
of imports being relatively more important than exports, increasing input costs measured
in local currencies are of major concern such that stock prices are negatively affected by
a rising dollar. This explains the aforementioned negative exposure during the first half of
the 1980s, when the German trade balance was temporarily negative.
Moreover, results show that very large deviations of the dollar from its long-run median
level have a negative impact on stock prices. This finding implies that extreme situations
(in either direction) on the currency market have adverse effects on firm values. Going
more into details, it turns out that the impact of large appreciations seems to be less
significant than the impact of large depreciations. Summing up, it can be concluded that
German companies face significant costs of adjustment to large upward and downward
swings of the US dollar.
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21. Introduction
Are German stock values vulnerable to exchange rate movements? Classical
financial theory implies that stock market values of firms should be affected by
foreign exchange rate risk (Dufey 1972, Shapiro 1974). However, according to
standard international portfolio choice models, optimally allocated world market
portfolios hedge against exchange rate risk (Solnik 1974, Adler and Dumas
1983). To the extent that foreign exchange risk represents unsystematic risk, it
can be diversified away, provided that investors and owners of equities have the
same quality of information about the firm as management – a condition not
likely to prevail in practice (Dufey and Giddy, 2003). Tests of predictions derived
from such theoretical considerations have been facilitated by the work of Adler
and Dumas (1980, 1984), who have shown that exchange rate exposure can be
measured as the sensitivity of stock returns to exchange rate movements within
the simple framework of linear regression models. 
Econometric studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency
exposure (see Jorion 1990 and 1991, Bodnar and Gentry 1993, He and Ng
1998, Dominguez and Tesar 2001 a,b,c, Koutmos and Martin 2003, inter alia). If
found in the data, exchange rate exposure is expected to be related to interna-
tional trade. However, based on data from eight countries, Dominguez and
Tesar (2001 b,c), for instance, conclude that they do not find a strong connec-
tion between trade and exposure. Recent studies discuss possible reasons for
this lack of significance, as there are, for instance, time-varying risks (De Santis
and Gerard 1998, Tai 2000), hedging activities (Allayannis and Ofek 2001,
Crabb 2002), neglected issues of competitiveness within industrial sectors
(Marston 2001), potential nonlinearities (Bartram 2002) or asymmetric exposure
(Koutmos and Martin 2003).
This study takes a fresh look at the subject using German data. Due to its high
international dependency, Germany is very well suited for testing the existence
of exchange rate exposure. Our approach extends the literature in several
3ways. The usual way of measuring “residual” exchange rate exposure is
choosing a CAPM specification augmented by exchange rate risk. We deviate
from this tradition by controlling for other additional potential macroeconomic
risks such as inflation and interest rate fluctuations as well, i.e. we follow multi-
factor-modelling in the spirit of Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) instead of aug-
mented CAPM, thus avoiding some omitted variable bias. We argue that mac-
roeconomic shocks such as divergent monetary and fiscal policies, as well as
asynchronous output movements might drive stock returns and exchange rates
in multidimensional ways such that any prediction of the prevailing impact of ex-
change rates on stock returns is regime-dependent (see Gavin, 1989). Follow-
ing further along these lines, we take account of time-dependency risks by run-
ning moving-window regressions. In order to exploit the longitudinal information
within the data of German DAX corporations used, we propose to apply rolling-
panel estimation techniques.
The role of second or higher moments caused by exchange rate adjustment
costs, although at the heart of uncertainty caused by exchange rate fluctuations,
has received surprisingly little attention in the literature (remarkable exceptions
being Miller and Reuter 1998, Andren 2001, Bartram 2002, and Priestley and
Odegaard, 2002). Theoretical analysis reveals that profits and firm values are a
convex function of the exchange rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle
1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among others). Several recent research articles
have been motivated by the fact that a high percentage of firms use hedging
strategies (see Bodnar and Gebhard 1998, and Bartram et al., 2003, for sur-
veys) to circumvent such costs of adjustment, and focus on hedging and re-
duced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, options or other hedging
strategies. The great bulk of research, however, neglects that there might be
substantial costs of hedging, and that hedging costs depend on the exchange
rate itself (see Dufey and Giddy, 2003, for strategies of managing corporate for-
eign exchange risk and related costs). The price of an option, for instance, in-
creases convexly with the expectation for a currency’s volatility because of
4inherent leverage effects: the more volatile, the higher the price. Our paper
takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by modelling exposure in de-
pendence of exchange rate variation. Grounded on theoretical arguments (see
Franke 1991, for instance) and empirical evidence (see Engel and Hamilton,
1990, and succeeding research), both stressing the importance of mean-
reverting exchange rates, we analyse the impact of substantial current devia-
tions from expected long-run benchmarks.
We estimate exchange rate exposure and test our hypotheses using perform-
ance indices from the German DAX corporations of the time 1977 to 1995,
which was a period without adjustment processes following the breakdown of
the Bretton Wood system in 1973 (Bartov et al. 1996), and without anticipatory
distortions in the face of the forthcoming introduction of the euro in 1999.
Our primary intention is to derive conclusions with respect to aggregate ex-
change rate exposure of the German economy. We thus focus on a macroeco-
nomic (macrofinancial) point of view, although we draw our conclusions on re-
turns observed for individual stock companies. We find a rather unstable expo-
sure of German stock market companies. In general (on average), German ex-
posure is well described through the role of a net exporter, who benefits from
the depreciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estimations of time-varying
exposure based on DM/US-dollar risks have a positive sign with the exception
of the first half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a
strong US dollar changed the situation. Persistent deviations of exchange rates
from their long-run values have a significant impact on exposure. We find that
the larger the distance of current exchange rates from their long-median is, the
lower company values are. Moreover, there is evidence that impact curves are
nonlinear and asymmetric. Results are in accordance with long-run
mean (median) reversion and asymmetric adjustment costs.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present previous research.
5Section 3 describes our econometric specification, and in Section 4 we intro-
duce the data sets employed. Section 5 informs about estimation results, and in
Section 6 results are briefly summarized.
2. Previous Research
Most studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency expo-
sure. Jorion (1990) analysed the exposure to exchange rates of 287 U.S. multi-
nationals and found that only 15 of them are significantly affected by exchange
rates. Bodnar and Gentry (1993), who provided evidence based on industry
data for Canada, Japan and the U.S, reported that between 20 and 35 percent
of industries have statistically significant exchange rate exposures. He and Ng
(1998) investigated the exchange rate exposure of Japanese corporations and
found that for the period 1979 to December 1993, only 25 percent of the 171
Japanese multinationals have significant exposure. Dominguez and Tesar
(2001) examine the extent of firm and industry-level exposure in a sample of
industrialized and developing countries for the period 1980-1999. In the pooled
eight-country sample, they found that 23 percent of firms and 40 percent of in-
dustries are exposed to at least one of their indicators of exchange rate expo-
sure (US dollar, trade-weighted exchange rate, currency of the country’s major
trading partner). Koutmos and Martin (2003) analysed exchange rate exposure
in nine aggregate sectors of major economies (Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States), and confirmed existence of exposure in ap-
proximately 40 percent of the country-sector models.
Many recent empirical studies focus their research on factors that determine the
extent of exposure. An evident question is whether exchange rate exposure is
influenced through the channel of international trade. Previous research in this
area was pioneered by Jorion (1990), who showed that a firm’s exchange rate
exposure is positively related to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. This re-
sult was extended and confirmed by recent work of He and Ng (1978), Domin-
6guez and Tesar (2001), and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), inter alia. He and Ng
(1998) showed that Japanese multinationals with higher exposure levels are
related to higher export shares. However, looking at international evidence,
Dominguez and Tesar (2001b,c) concluded that they did not find a strong con-
nection between trade and exposure, although there seems to be some evi-
dence that a higher level of foreign sales corresponds to higher exposure for
Germany (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001c, Table 10). Marston (2001) has drawn
attention to the fact that even a local firm which neither exports nor imports can
be exposed to changes in exchange rates, for instance if it competes with for-
eign firms in the domestic market. Thus, as is known from the related literature
on exchange-rate pass-through, an important determinant is the competitive
structure of the industry in which a firm operates. Some studies have shown
that the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCDs), i.e. a short-term (less than
one year) hedging strategy, is related to exchange rate exposure. Allayannis
and Ofek (2001) found that the use of FCDs is negatively related to the absolute
value of foreign currency exposure. By controlling for hedging activity, Crabb
(2002) provided evidence that previous studies often found insignificant effects
because hedging mitigated currency risks. Exchange rate exposure seems to
be higher when companies operate within a system of liberalized exchange
rates. Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996) consider the switch from fixed to floating
exchange rates following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973
and found increasing risks thereafter, whereas Bartram and Karolyi (2003)
showed that the introduction of the euro in 1999 was accompanied by signifi-
cant reductions in market risk exposures in and outside of Europe.
Due to its high share of sales going to exports and its high share of imported
goods, Germany is very well suited for testing exchange rate exposure. Indeed,
Bartram (2002), who argued that exchange rate exposure may be partly nonlin-
ear, identified both linear and nonlinear exposure components using data of 447
German corporations. However, at the sector level, Koutmos and Martin (2003)
found significant exchange rate exposure for only one out of nine sectors in
7Germany. Based on returns of 12 sector indexes, Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998)
detected significant (positive) exposure for chemicals, motor cars and machin-
ery, steel production, and holdings, suggesting that exposure in Germany is
mainly driven by exporting activities1. Glaum et. al (2000) showed that total ex-
change rate exposure is unstable over time. Entorf (2000) estimated a time-
varying measure of overall German currency risk and showed that it significantly
depends both on German exports and imports.
3. Econometric specification: Orthogonalization issues, APT
versus augmented CAPM, and time-varying measurement
As in most studies measuring exchange rate exposure, we follow Adler and
Dumas (1984) who showed that the extent of corporate exposure boils down to
the slope parameter ib  of a regression
(1) i i i ir a b d   
where ri is the stock market return of company i, i = 1,2,…N, and d is the return
of the exchange rate. Most previous econometric studies further control for
overall market risk mr  leading to a CAPM specification augmented by exchange
rate movements,
(2)  it i i t i mt itr a b d r     ,
based on time series observations. The “conditional” or “residual” effect (as it
was called by Bodnar and Wong, 2000), i.e. the exposure that is different from
general market exposure, measured by ib  in equation (2), is then interpreted as
“residual” exchange rate exposure, whereas the slope parameter in equation (1)
would imply some measure of “total” exposure (Bodnar and Wong, 2000) that
                                           
1 Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) estimated the extent of “total” exchange rate exposure by regressing
foreign exchange rates on stock returns without controlling for general market risks, whereas Kout-
mos and Martin (2003) estimated the “residual” effect by including the overall market factor.
8might be disturbed by some spurious effects arising when common market
factors drive both exchange rates and (all) stock returns simultaneously (due to
unanticipated monetary shocks, for instance).
Sensitivity of individual firm values to overall market risk (i.e. the “beta” of a firm
in the context of non-augmented CAPM modelling) is covered by i . A problem
with specification (2) is that overall market exposure mr , which in empirical stud-
ies is represented by broad market indices such as the DAX, includes several
driving factors, of which exchange rate risk may be particularly important. Thus,
insignificance of previous results might arise from the fact that currency risks
were already included in overall risk and priced in market risk factors, leading to
the misleading statistical result that collinearity between market portfolios and
exchange rates prevents significant results. To circumvent a problem such as
this, we apply a strategy well known from testing Arbitrage Pricing Theory
(APT). McElroy and Burmeister (1988) introduced the use of the so-called “re-
sidual market factor” which implies orthogonalization of overall market risk and
other risk factors which only consist of exchange rates in the present case of
augmented CAPM. Thus, we first estimate an auxiliary regression to capture
that particular fraction of aggregate market risk which was induced by exchange
rate fluctuations:
(3) mt t mtr a b d r  
The residual of the regression, mtr , represents the residual market factor, i.e. the
overall market risk corrected for the influence of exchange rates. Inserting mtr
from equation (3) into equation (2) gives
(4) it i i t i mt itr d r       ,
where i i ia a    and i i ib b   . Thus, i  summarizes direct and indirect com-
ponents of exchange rate exposure, whereas the coefficient i on mtr remains the
same as on mtr  in equation (2).
9One may argue that it is precisely the incremental effect of exchange rate
movements not covered by market risk, i.e. of ib  in equation (2), which is of par-
ticular interest here, because it represents the firm-specific component of ex-
change rate exposure. However, a firm should be interested in hedging the risk
of total potential value changes resulting from exchange rate changes, irrespec-
tive of whether these changes affect the common risk of all firms or the risk of
the individual firm only. After all, in our study we are, by way of aggregating in-
dividual data, primarily interested in exchange exposure faced by the German
economy as a whole, not in marginal exposure of particular firms. From these
points of view, exposing the relevant currency risk by way of orthogonalization
seems to be an adequate strategy which has been followed by some authors
before.2
Augmented CAPM specification of exposure estimation regression overlooks
the fact that further macroeconomic factors besides exchange rates can influ-
ence individual returns. For instance, a depreciation might be related to some
                                           
2 However, there seems to be some confusion as to what kind of orthogonalization should be used in
econometric tests of the Adler-Dumas framework. Most applications we am aware of proceed in the
manner described above (Doukas et al. 1999, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, Griffin and Stulz, 2001,
Bris et al. 2002, Priestley and Odegaard, 2002, among others), whereas Jorion (1991) proposed to
orthogonalize exchange rates, i.e. he employed the reverse regression by regressing exchange rates
on market portfolios, and he used the residual from this regression as orthogonalized exchange rates
which he included in the exposure regression in addition to total market risk. This approach is coun-
terintuitive and does not coincide with the usual way of orthogonalization known from multi-factor APT
modelling. It is also misleading as it does not solve the problem of “hidden” exposure covered and
priced in overall market risk. The estimated parameter on orthogonalized exchange rates, i.e. esti-
mated exposure, is even identical to estimated exposure of unorthogonalized exchange rates of
equation (2) in reversed regressions, whereas the coefficient of market risk would change its value
(see (4) and substitute variables accordingly). Motivated by related work of Choi and Prasad (1995),
Glaum et al. (2000) followed the way described in Jorion (1991). Not surprisingly, they did not find any
significant “residual” exposure for German data.  From this, they erroneously draw the conclusion that
estimating “total” exchange rate exposure (in the sense of equation (1)) would be a better way of pro-
ceeding.
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expansionary monetary policy that simultaneously could have a positive impact
on economic activity of domestic firms (Dornbusch, 1976). From the more gen-
eral viewpoint of financial and macroeconomic theory, Gavin (1989) provided a
framework that shows how exchange rates and stock returns interact, and how
they react to changes in interest rates, output, and, in particular, to anticipated
and unanticipated changes of monetary and fiscal policy (see also Blanchard,
1981, for a related work).3 From the viewpoint of financial economics, a well
known strategy for using controls for such disturbing macroeconomic influences
is the application of “Arbitrage Pricing Theory” (APT), pioneered by Ross
(1976), and already introduced by Jorion (1991) to the literature on exchange
exposure.4 In our econometric model, we apply the multi-factor equation of the
APT model5, according to which the variation of stock returns is explained by a
K-factor model of the form Kr Bf    , where r  is  the vector of returns in N
stock prices, and Kf  is a vector of K (unanticipated) factors, of which only the
(residual) market factor and exchange-rate fluctuations were used in previous
augmented CAPM specifications of the exposure regressions.6 B  is a NxK ma-
trix of factor sensitivities to the K factors.
                                           
3 It should be noted, however, that there are good reasons for neglecting potential problems of en-
dogeneity in our specification, since left-hand side variables, i.e. corporate returns, are observed at
the individual level, whereas explanatory variables such as exchange rate fluctuations or trade are
given at the aggregate level, which is exogenous to each individual firm.
4 The reason why this idea was widely neglected in later work might be that he used orthogonalized
exchange rates (instead of orthogonalized market factor) such that significance was low and suffered
from multicollinearity.
5 We do not present estimations of a full APT model in this paper, because our focus is on time-
variant rolling window regressions based on panel information. A complete model consists of the joint
determination of factor sensitivities within the multi-factor model and of risk premia, which reveal
whether investors have to be compensated by a higher expected return because the exchange rate
risk or other risks are not diversifiable. Nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions of the complete
model have been performed in Jamin (1999) and Entorf and Jamin (2000).
6 Note that due to the orthogonalization of the residual market factor and macroeconomic factors,
CAPM boils down to be a simple parametric restriction of Arbitrage Pricing Theory.
11
There is no general rule for selecting relevant macroeconomic risk factors. Ac-
cording to the “discounted cash flow model”, which assumes that prices of as-
sets are determined through their expected discounted dividend payments,
factors have to be selected that are potentially responsible for the determination
of these payments. Inspired by factors proposed by Chen et al. (1986), who
pioneered the empirical approach of estimating the APT, we include a survey
indicator of the German business climate, the inflation rate, the term structure, a
(residual) market factor, and, in particular, the US dollar, representing the most
important source of German exchange rate risk. Since only unexpected compo-
nents of macroeconomic time series can influence asset returns in efficient
capital markets, we calculate unexpected variation of all variables applying
ARMA- and ARIMA-filtering techniques. In order to capture the (residual) mar-
ket risk that is not explained by other systematic risk factors, we follow the pro-
cedure suggested by McElroy and Burmeister (1988) described above. There-
fore we include the residual market factor that is represented by the residual of
an OLS-regression of the market return on the unexpected components of mac-
roeconomic variables (which is a generalization of equation (3)). Now equation
(4) can be extended to the specification of an APT exposure regression which
looks as follows:
(5) uit i i t i mt i t itr d r f         ,
where f represents a vector of macroeconomic variables, and the superscript u
denotes unexpected components.7
We extend previous approaches by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of
company firm values using fixed company effects8 which might arise due to par-
                                           
7 Not surprisingly, testing ARIMA models for the DM/dollar rate as well as for market risk factors has
led to the conclusion that their (short-term) time series behaviour is well described by a random walk.
Thus, we treat returns of the DM/dollar rate and of the market factors as unexpected components.
Note missing superscripts in equation (5).
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ticular features not observable in the data (management, reputation, etc.). With
individual DAX companies available, we stack individual time series and run
each of presented specifications (1), (2), (4) and (5) as systems of seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR). SUR considers correlations of disturbances
across companies and leads to GLS estimation of the whole system. Stacking
companies allows several tests as well as estimation of aggregate exposure: 1)
is i   for every company i  (test for unobserved heterogeneity))? , 2) the test-
able restriction i   for every i  gives an estimate of aggregate stock market
exposure, 3) if the restriction i   holds, then the universe of all German DAX
companies would share a common overall market risk, and 4) if 0i   for every
i ,  then APT could be restricted to augmented CAPM.
Even after controlling for macroeconomic risks, unobservable macroeconomic
and financial changes may result in unstable currency exposure. Moreover, ex-
posure reflects expectations of investors which do not depend on the whole
history of financial markets, but rather on limited information sets. Thus, estima-
tions should be time-varying, and they should give much more weight on recent
observations. Accordingly, we estimate equation (5) using moving window re-
gressions, with each additional rolling sample giving a new estimate it .
 9
Most applications of exchange rate exposure models are based on two-stage
procedures, pioneered by the work of Jorion (1990). In the standard first stage,
by running N time series regressions, the stock returns of a sample of N com-
panies are regressed on the exchange rate within an augmented CAPM dis-
cussed above (see equation (2)). Second-stage specifications then consist of
regressing exchange rate exposure ib  on indicators of foreign involvement, or
                                                                                                                                                    
8 We do not test for random effects because our primary goal is to achieve consistent results of the
exposure parameters needed in the second stage of the estimation procedure (to be discussed be-
low).
9 As only unanticipated realizations enter the APT multifactor model, unexpected components of all
explanatory variables are calculated using residuals from ARIMA models for each rolling sample.
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other determinants of exposure discussed above. We extend this procedure by
performing moving APT multifactor models, thereby employing panel informa-
tion of company returns. Disposing of resulting time-varying exposures 
it
  (in-
stead of i  or ib ) in second-stage regressions allows us to focus on panel data
and time series instead of cross sections to analyse the (macro-) economic de-
terminants of exchange rate exposure.
4. Data
Our sample of stocks includes 28 leading German corporations comprising the
DAX (the leading index of the Frankfurt stock exchange) on the 31st of March
1995.10 They represent about 70 % of total turnover in German stocks during
the sample period.11 Monthly returns for the period from January 1977 through
March 1995 are adjusted for dividends, capital increases and splits according to
adjustment factors obtained from KKMDB, i.e the “Karlsruhe Data Base for Fi-
nancial Time Series” (“Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank”).12
Macroeconomic risks are based on the following variables:
 Business climate: Monthly change rate of the “ifo business climate” (“ifo-
Geschaeftsklimaindex”), an acknowledged German leading business cycle
indicator published by CESifo (Munich).
 Inflation: Monthly rate of change in the German consumer price index (“Le-
benshaltungskostenindex”) calculated by the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice (Statistisches Bundesamt).
                                           
10 In order to take advantage of a balanced panel, VIAG and Henkel had to be excluded as their re-
turns were not available for the whole estimation period.
11 See Sauer, A. (1994), p. 102.
12 KKMDB was supported by the German National Science Foundation (DFG, Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft) to provide a file of German stock prices and performance indices for scientific
use. For further information see http://finance.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de/Forschung/kkmdb.html.
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 Term structure: Difference between the 10-year rate on German government
bonds and the 1-month money market rate, both calculated by Deutsche
Bundesbank (Frankfurt).
 Exchange rate: We use closing prices of the “Deutsche Mark (DM)/ US dol-
lar” exchange rate at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market. As our objective
is to examine the particular importance of the US dollar for German stock
companies, we refrain from using trade-weighted averages of different cur-
rencies, as was proposed by Jorion (1990, 1991), and applied by Bodnar and
Gentry (1993) and others.13
The overall German market risk is based on the DAFOX (“Deutscher Aktien-
Forschungs-Index”), which is a Laspeyres performance index including all 30
DAX corporations as a subset (see Göppl and Schütz, 1993, for details). It was
generated for scientific research purposes in order to dispose of a broader in-
dex of overall German stock market portfolio than the one provided by the DAX,
which only consists of German blue chips (source: KKMDB).
Indicators of foreign involvement are available as shares of exported and im-
ported goods and services in German GDP (West Germany, source:
                                           
13 The use of trade-weighted indices was proposed by Jorion (1990, 1991) who analysed US expo-
sure. In the US, however, there is no single currency which is as important as the US dollar for Ger-
man or European economies. In Germany, the US dollar clearly is the centre of investors’ attention,
as can be seen from perpetual and recurrent comments in newspapers, even very recently, i.e. at a
time when a majority of German contracts are factorized in domestic currency, i.e. in euro: “Up or
down, euro leaves exporters complaining” (International Herald Tribune, May 9, 2003), “Anleger ver-
kaufen Exportwerte. Aufwertung von Yen und Euro trüben Gewinnaussichten japanischer und euro-
päischer Firmen”  (“Investors sell shares of export-oriented companies. Appreciation of yen and euro
obscure expected profit of Japanese and European firms” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September
23, 2003). From this quotations, note the relevance of US dollars as ”euro“ always refers to US-
dollar/euro. Moreover, note the high relevance of the DM/dollar rate for the euro, as it was the key
currency in Europe, and its share amounted to 33.07 percent (second largest share: French Franc,
20.28 percent) of the basket of currencies constituting the ecu, i.e. the “synthetic” currency preceding
the euro.
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Statistisches Bundesamt). This allows us to consider the burden of (imported)
input costs as well, an issue that is often neglected in empirical studies which
mainly limit their focus to foreign sales.
5. Results
5.1. Direction and Magnitude of Exposure
We compare exposure estimates of augmented CAPM and APT-based models
for different periods of time in Tables 1 to 3. Our sample consists of monthly
returns of 28 DAX companies for the time period January 1977 to March 1995,
leading to 6132 observations. The sample period lies well beyond the beginning
of floating exchange rates in 1973 and well ahead the introduction of the euro in
1999. This selection avoids potentially misleading results due to adjustment
problems after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system described by
Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996), or because of anticipating investment deci-
sions in the face of a forthcoming introduction of the euro (see Bartram and
Karolyi, 2003).
In Table 1, column (1), estimates of the augmented CAPM reveal that company-
specific effects turn out to be insignificant. Evidently, observed heterogeneity
measured by company-specific exposure itb  and company-specific influences
from market factors render control for unobserved heterogeneity meaningless.
All company estimates of exchange rate exposure have a positive sign, and 12
of them are significant. As regards market betas, individual estimates of overall
market influences range between 0.79 (RWE, a former energy utility) and 1.32
(Daimler, car production).
In Table 1, column (2), we test for common exposure, identical to all DAX com-
panies. This hypothesis is not rejected. Exposure is highly significant and esti-
mated to be 0.172. Thus, for the period 1977 to 1995, an increase of the DM/US
dollar-exchange rate by 10 percent (i.e. a depreciation of domestic, i.e. German,
16
currency) on average increased stock market values of German companies by
1.7 percent.
Table 1, column (3), additionally restricts individual coefficients of overall market
portfolio risk to be identical for all companies. The aggregate estimate is 1.072,
indicating overall offensive behaviour of German DAX companies in the long
run. However, testing the restriction shows that the hypothesis of a common pa-
rameter has to be rejected (see footnote of Table 1 for details of hypothesis
testing). The estimate of exchange rate exposure remains almost unchanged
(0.168 instead of 0.172).
Finally, specification (2) is replicated using the overall market factor mr instead of
the residual market factor mr . Indeed, for reasons discussed in Section 3, using
this specification leads to insignificance of exchange rate exposure. Thus, we
can conclude that exchange rate exposure is an important determinant of Ger-
man stock values, but that it would not show up in standard residual exposure
models based on overall market risk.
General market risk presumably has more than one dimension. Table 2 controls
for further macroeconomic factors within the framework of an APT-based multi-
factor model. Table 2, column (1), presents unrestricted14 estimates. At a first
glance, results do not differ much from corresponding column (1) of Table 1:
Now 26 out of 28 company exposures have a positive sign (and 8 of them are
significant instead of 12 in Table 1), and the range of market betas is almost the
same as before (ranging between RWE’s 0.79 and Daimler’s 1.34).15 However,
inspecting column (2) shows that the aggregate estimate of exchange rate ex-
posure is only 0.139 (instead of 0.172), indicating some omitted variable bias of
                                           
14 As before, tests show insignificance of company-specific fixed effects.
15 Company-specific exposures and sensitivities to overall market factors are presented in Tables C,D
of the Appendix.
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the augmented CAPM specification, i.e. when other macroeconomic factors
were ignored.16
Table 2, column (3), shows that sensitivity to overall market risk remains almost
unchanged compared to CAPM in Table 1. In column (4), company-specific
sensitivities to other macroeconomic factors are restricted to be identical to
some aggregate estimate. Estimated parameters are highly significant, indicat-
ing that restricting APT to CAPM would not be justified by the data. Directions of
influence are in line with usual economic reasoning. First, (non-anticipated) in-
flation has a negative impact on stock market returns. This might imply that in-
vestors expect a negative impact of increasing money depreciation on company
profits. The negative parameter of changes of the term structure is in line with
the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure, as an increase in the
term structure implies the expectation of increasing future interest rates, and
therefore a heavier discounting of future profits. The parameter estimate of the
ifo business climate indicator has a positive sign, confirming its role as ac-
knowledged leading economic indicator for German companies.
Table 3 reveals that exchange rate exposure is not stable over time. To show
changing parameter estimates, we divide our sample into four different, rather
heterogeneous subperiods. The situation of the first period, 1977 to 1979, is
characterized by a well performing German economy and appreciation of the
Deutsche Mark. The DM/dollar-exchange rate fell from 2.40 at the beginning of
1977 to 1.70 in December 1979. The next six years, 1980 to 1985, are pre-
dominated by the second oil price shock and the recession in 1981/82, and a
sustainable depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against the dollar, reaching its
peak in March 1985, when the DM/dollar rate was 3.36. After the so-called
Plaza Agreement reached in September 1985 by the G-5 countries (France,
                                           
16 The bias will be become more conclusive when different estimation periods are considered (see
Table 3 discussed below).
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Japan, West Germany,  the UK and US), on a need to adjust current exchange,
the time span 1986 to 1990 was characterised by a now strongly depreciating
dollar. The DM/dollar rate fell to 1.50 at the end of 1990. The final period, 1991
to 1995, includes  the time after German unification with a relatively stable but
low DM/dollar rate (fluctuating around 1.60, maximum: 1.82, minimum: 1.37).
Table 3 shows aggregate exposure17 to DM/dollar movements estimated from
statistically preferred specifications of previous tables, i.e. along column (2) of
Tables 1 and 2. For reasons of comparison, we also include measurements of
total exposure based on bivariate regression (1). Looking at APT-based specifi-
cations, estimated exposure varied intensely from -0.308 in 1980/1985 to 0.447
during the time period 1991 to1995. The estimate of the period 1980 to 1985,
i.e. the period of a very strong dollar and deep recession, was the only period
with a negative exposure. The estimate (–0.308) indicates that a 10 percent in-
crease of the DM/dollar exchange rate has led to a 3.1 percent fall of DAX stock
returns. Thus, it seems as if further depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against
the US dollar shied away investors during the space of 1980 and 1985, whereas
other analogous times of a relatively strong dollar (or weak DM) had stimulating
effects on the German economy.
                                           
17 Company-specific estimates are presented in Tables C,D (Appendix).
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Table 1: Estimation of exposure using augmented CAPM, 1977-1995
Model: it i i t i mt itr d r      
Para-
meter
(1) (2) (3) (2’)
Test of common alpha1) Test of common
exposure2)
Test of common mar-
ket risk3)
Use of mr
instead  of mr
     0.0081**
  (0.0005)
 " "i  not rejected
  0.0081**
(0.0005)
     0.0081**
 (0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0005)
 number of companies
with positive exposure:
28
(significant: 12),
number of companies
with negative exposure:
0
0.172**
 (0.014)
 " "i  not re-
jected
   0.168**
 (0.014)
  - 0.002
     (0.014)
 company specific,
range:
0.79 (RWE)  - 1.32
(Daimler)
company specific,
range:
0.79 (RWE)  - 1.32
(Daimler)
  1.071**
 (0.010)
 " "i  rejected
company spe-
cific, range:
0.79 (RWE) -
1.32 (Daimler)
2R 0.529 0.529 0.519 0.529
Notes: Sample: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03, (6132 observations). See the text for estimation
details. **) denotes significance at 1 percent level. Restrictions are tested using F-Tests: 1) test for
unobserved company effects, 2) (2) is tested against (1), 3) (3) is tested against (2). Corresponding F-
statistics: 1) F= 0.79, 2) F=1.10, 3) F= 5.36. Critical values: F(27, , 5%) =1.46, F(27,  , 1%) = 1.69
.
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Table 3 allows us to compare “total” exposure with “residual” exposure either
from multifactor specifications or from augmented CAPM modelling. As mac-
roeconomic factors are significantly different from zero in specification (5), we
may conclude that estimates both for total exposure and for estimates based
on augmented CAPM suffer from omitted variable biases. The bias can be
substantial, as can be seen, for instance, from the time period 1980 - 1985,
when total exposure was -0.18, whereas multi-factor exposure was 0.31, or
from the period 1986 - 1990, when exposure from augmented CAPM was
0.53, whereas the APT-based estimate amounts to 0.30.
Figure 1 displays aggregate time-varying exposures from moving window re-
gressions. The specification is based on equation (5), where company-
specific exposures and company-specific macroeconomic effects are re-
stricted to be identical to corresponding aggregate parameters (as presented
in Table 2, column (4)). These estimates do not differ significantly from statis-
tically superior results without such a restriction (compare columns (2) and (4)
of Table 3).18 Rolling samples cover a time span of 48 months. Estimated ex-
posures of each rolling regression period are displayed at the month of the
midterm period. Thus, the first observation in Figure 1 presented for Decem-
ber 1978 represents estimated exposure of the estimation period 1977:01 –
1980:12, the last observation dated March 1993 covers the period 1991:04 –
1995:03 (note that this last period almost coincides with the last period ana-
lysed in Table 3). Figure 1 illustrates previous estimates from Table 3 in more
detail. The graph nicely exhibits the time-varying nature of the German
“dance with the dollar” which implies, for instance, that an appreciating dollar
                                           
18 Attempts to estimate individual parameters for each company and for each rolling sample turned
out to be unfeasible due to convergence problems of sample-specific ARIMA modelling and sin-
gularity problems.
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(relative to Deutsche Mark) temporarily entails decreasing company returns
(as in 1980 to 1985), and at other times implied increasing values of German
companies. A noticeable drop of exchange rate exposure not detectable in
estimations of longer time periods happened around 1990, i.e. the time of the
fall of the Iron Curtain.
Before we analyse the determinants for the time-varying exposure in more
detail, we may conclude that the assumption of a stable currency exposure is
not justified.19 This result does not necessarily come as a surprise, as cur-
rency exposure interacts with overall market portfolio in augmented CAPM or
APT-based specifications of which we already know the stylised fact that
market betas (i.e.   in our notation) are not stable over time.20
                                           
19 This finding confirms previous results based on total exposure put forward independently of each
other by Glaum et al. (1990) and Entorf (2000). The general time pattern of exposure presented
there roughly coincides with the one presented in Figure 1, but levels differ and curves appear to
be more erratic when they are based on total exposure.
20 Early evidence on beta-instability dates from the 1970s (see, for instance, Blume 1975). More
recent evidence using more sophisticated tests is reported in, e.g., Bos and Newbold (1984) and
Gonzales-Rivera (1997). See Table D (Appendix) for company-specific variations in our sample.
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Figure 1: Time-varying exchange rate exposure in Germany
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Note: Estimates are based on moving window regressions of APT-multifactor specifications,
see equation (5) and Tables 2, 3. See the text for estimation details.
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5.2. Determinants of Exposure
Costs and benefits of a weakening dollar differ between firms. Exporters like
car producers suffer from appreciation of domestic currency relative to the
dollar, whereas companies which ground their production on a high share of
inputs factorized in US dollars (like energy utilities) would realize unexpected
windfall profits. Studies analysing determinants of exposure, in particular
when they are based on data at the company level, focus on foreign sales but
often ignore exchange-rate dependent costs from importing inputs. As we are
interested in estimating and analysing the aggregate role of exposure in
Germany, we use both export shares and import shares of (West) German
GDP in order to analyse the dual and ambivalent role of exchange rate
movements for the German economy. From the viewpoint of a representative
firm operating in a world-wide economy, we expect that in situations domi-
nated by the interests of foreign sales (German exporters), there will be a
positive impact from depreciation of the domestic (German) currency on the
firm value, whereas the opposite would apply in situations which are charac-
terized by a relative strong dependency on the costs coming from imports.
Thus, we expect exposure to have a positive sign in situations of dominating
exports, and to be negative during periods of relatively high imports. As Ger-
many for the most part had a surplus in its trade balance, it is well described
by the situation of a net exporter, and we expect a positive sign for exports
and a negative sign for imports in second-stage regressions devoted to the
analysis of determinants of exposure.
Firm values are affected by costs of adjustment. The role of adjustment costs
caused by the order of magnitude of exchange rate movements has received
26
surprisingly little attention in the literature.21 Theoretical analysis shows that
profits and firm values may be a convex function of the exchange rate (see
Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among oth-
ers). Convexities can arise because of costly adjustments of international
portfolios, or when volatile exchange rates affect uncertainty of future prices
of exported or imported goods, among others. For instance, underestimating
the risk of an exchange rate change might facilitate over-expansion of foreign
indebtedness exposing firms to high costs when exchange rates do change.
Moreover, marketing investments in foreign markets (German car producers
in the US, for instance) and other entry costs might become sunk costs when
a future appreciation of the domestic currency undermines the competitive-
ness of exporting corporations. Motivated by the fact that a high percentage
of firms use hedging strategies to circumvent such costs of adjustment22,
                                           
21 Only a few articles test and estimate nonlinearities in exposure models. Whereas Miller and
Reuer (1998) and Andren (2001) tested for exposure of quadratic and cubic macro-price changes
with insignificant or weak results, Bartram (2002) performed several tests for nonlinearities with
and without structure and confirmed the need to model nonlinear exposure by referring to signifi-
cance of cubic terms. Results by Priestley and Odegaard (2002) point to the conclusion that ex-
porters are subject to nonlinear exposure but importers are not. Our testing strategy differs from
that of quoted articles in various aspects and is based on different data sets. Closest to our ap-
proach, Miller and Reuer (1998), Andren (2001) and Koutmos and Martin (2003) focus on asym-
metric adjustment to depreciations and appreciations, but performed one-stage estimations based
on (linear) dichotomous indicators of asymmetry make it necessary to analyse 9 possible out-
comes for exposure such that structural interpretations are difficult to derive. Koutmos and Martin
(2003) also employed conditional heteroskedasticity of error terms of estimated sector stock mar-
ket returns, but they do not consider higher moments in their CAPM augmented market model.
22 Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) report that in comparative samples of US and German firms, 78%
of German firms compared to 57% of US firms make use of derivatives in risk management. More
recently, Bartram et al. (2003) present international evidence on financial derivatives usage for a
sample of 7,292 non-financial firms. Across all 410 German firms in the sample, there were only
44.9 percent using derivatives in general, while 36.8 percent use currency derivatives.
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several recent papers focus on hedging and reduced risk stemming from the
use of forward contracts, options or other hedging strategies, but they neglect
to say that there might be substantial costs of hedging, and that the cost of
hedging depends on the exchange rate itself (see Giddy and Dufey, 2003, for
strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk and related costs).
The price of an option, for instance, increases convexly with the expectation
for a currency’s volatility because of inherent leverage effects: the more vola-
tile, the higher the price.
Our paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by modelling ex-
posure in dependence of exchange rate variation. Moreover, in line with
Franke (1991), who assumed the exchange rate to be mean reverting, and
motivated by confirming empirical evidence found by Engel and Hamilton
(1990), Frankel and Rose (1996), Sweeney (2001), inter alia, we test the hy-
pothesis that firm values are influenced by the absolute distance of the ex-
change rate from its long-run mean. More precisely, based on previous con-
siderations on adjustment costs and convexities, we expect that a growing
absolute distance between exchange rates (levels) and their expected long-
run mean (or median) ( )t tD m D  would lead to increasing costs and reduced
corporate values, respectively. If this hypothesis is true, exchange rate expo-
sure, which measures the extent of changed firm values with respect to
changes in exchange rates, should decrease with rising ( )t tD m D , possibly in
a non-linear functional form.
                                                                                                                                                
Corresponding international numbers for all firms of the sample from 48 countries, 59.8% and
43.6%, respectively, show that such practices seem to be less widespread in Germany than else-
where.
28
Table 4 shows estimation results of the second-stage regressions. According
to previous considerations, estimated exposures it  are regressed on aggre-
gate export and import shares of GDP and on the relative distance between
the dollar and its expected long-run value. 23 24 Corporate-specific fixed ef-
fects control for unobserved heterogeneity (management strategies such as
individually different hedging practices, for instance).25 We stack individual
time series and base second stage regressions on specification (6), i.e.
(6) 0 1 2 ( ( ))it i i t i t i t t itexs ims f D m D          ,
which we use as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions, where exs
and ims represent export share and import share, respectively. Individ-
ual it are obtained from moving-window first-stage panel regressions which
                                           
23 Companies are exposed to exchange rate risk when it is different from zero. At first thought, it
seems natural to use absolute exposures it  and regress them on potential explanatory factors of
exposure. However, in order to interpret results in a meaningful way, it is necessary to analyse
channels of influence of, for instance, increasing exports on company returns via the impact of it .
As is obvious from Table 3, a higher it  does not automatically translate into higher company re-
turns, as during 1980 - 1985 exposure was estimated to be negative. Thus, the sign of it  is like-
wise important. Using absolute values instead of unchanged exposure would mask the possible
result that during the period at the beginning of the 80ies some increasing export performance
would have led to diminishing firm values, whereas in “normal” times (i.e. during all other time peri-
ods) German (average) company values would go up. Indeed, estimation results based on abso-
lute values show switching signs for exports and imports during 1980 to 1985 (results available on
request).
24 Table 4 is based on quarterly observations. Data on volumes of exports and imports for the
whole estimation period are available only on a quarterly basis. Monthly observations on exposure
and exchange rates are transformed to quarterly observations by merging last observations. Alter-
native frequency conversion by averaging monthly observations left parameter estimates almost
unchanged.
25 Company-specific effects are significant for all specifications presented in Table 4.
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consider company-specific APT factors (see equation (5)). As exposures it
are estimated from moving windows, point estimates are allocated midway of
each window, as displayed in Figure 1 (hence explanatory variables are
matched to the same centre point of each window).
Imposing the restrictions 1 1i   and 2 2i   for all companies i
26, column (1)
of Table 4 confirms the hypothesis that an increasing importance of exports
ceteris paribus leads to rising exposure, whereas a relative growth of imports
diminishes it. Column (2) shows that estimated parameters do not arise as a
statistical artefact due to some collinearity between export and import
shares.27 Estimated parameters are surprisingly high at first glance: Looking
at the estimate 6.84 for export share in column (1), an increase of the export
share by one percentage point would lead to an increase of exposure by al-
most 0.07 on average. However, exports and imports almost always move in
the same direction (both positively depend on fluctuations of world trade and
the German integration in global business cycles; the correlation coefficient
amounts to 0.54), such that the usual “ceteris paribus condition” has limited
appeal in historical situations.28  Confirming results for (exs-ims) dispel poten-
tial doubts that the signs of exports and imports might arise as a spurious re-
sult of collinearity between both variables. Table 3, column (3), informs about
                                           
26 Without this restriction, all 28 estimates of 1i are positive, of which 24 are significant. As regards
estimated parameters on imports ( 2i ), 28 are negative, of which 26 are significant (5%-level).
Testing 1 1i   and 2 2i   leads to the result of an invalid restriction at the 1% level (F=4.11,
critical value = 1.51). In spite of this result, Table 4 is limited to the presentation of restricted esti-
mation results in order to focus on aggregate evidence concerning the overall German economy.
27 An F-Test rejects the hypothesis at the 1% level (F=98.16, critical values at the 5% / 1% level =
3.84 / 6.64).
28 Note also the high variation among companies ranging between – 0.90 and 1.26: see Table B,
Appendix.
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the effect of aggregate foreign involvement, calculated as the sum of exports
and imports in German GDP. In line with other results found in the literature, it
can be concluded that the higher total foreign involvement is, the higher ag-
gregate exposure of firms is.
The next step is to test whether exposure observed for cross-sections of time
series is in line with the hypothesis of nonlinear adjustment costs, caused by
departing from expected long-run dollar values. Trials not documented in Ta-
ble 4 reveal that estimations based on the mean value of the sample period
(which was 2.083 DM/ $) were statistically inferior to results based on the
sample median (1.895). Thus, if taken literally, Table 4, cols (4) to (6), refer to
results on “median reversion” instead of “mean reversion”. The use of
( )t tD m D  implies a piecewise linear dependence of exposure on the distance
between the dollar and its long-run median, with the effect being symmetric
around the median. Indeed, Table 4, column (4), shows a negative sign which
implies that departing from the long-run median leads to a smaller it . Condi-
tional on corresponding average long-run results (see Table 2), which show
positive exposure estimates, this effect further implies a reduction of firm val-
ues, confirming the hypothesis of adjustment costs which increase with rising
distance to expected long-run fundamentals.
Asymmetries and nonlinearities are accounted for in Table 4, cols (5) and (6).
In addition to ( )t tD m D , a polynomial in ( ( ))t tD m D of 5
th order is fitted to the
data (column (5)). The curvatures of ( ( ))t tf D median D  from Table 4, column
(5) (incl. ( )t tD m D  ), and from Table 4, column (4), i.e. 0.529 ( )t tD m D  , are
depicted in Figure 2. Effects are calculated for DM/dollar ratios tD  ranging
from 1.39 to 3.36, i.e. between extreme values of the sample period. We ob-
serve that assuming linear effects symmetric to the median fails when tD  ei-
ther becomes very small or very high. This conclusion is confirmed by a non-
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parametric approach presented in Table 4, column (6). Using dummy vari-
ables, estimations show that when the DM/dollar rate exceeds 2.70, then ex-
posure values (and firm values) would be reduced by -0.545 with respect to
the median reference dummy (1.60 $ 2.00  ), whereas the linearity assumption
would predict a much more profound downward reaction. Analogous linear
reactions holds for tD  smaller than 1.60.
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However, responses appear to be asymmetric. Effects from appreciations of
domestic currency seem to be smaller than from depreciations. Koutmos and
Martin (2003) argue that exporting firms (with net long positions, i.e. foreign
currency receivables) may be inclined to hedge against domestic currency
appreciations yet remain unhedged against domestic currency depreciations,
whereas importers (with net short positions, i.e. with foreign currency pay-
ables) may be inclined to hedge domestic currency depreciations yet remain
unhedged against domestic currency appreciations. Under the assumption
that this reasonable description also holds for German companies, it seems
as if German exporters were more successful in curbing losses from strong
appreciations than importers in cutting losses from substantial depreciations.
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Figure 2: Departure from median values, piecewise linear and nonlinear effects
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Note: Effects refer to ( ( ))t tf D median D , Table 4, cols (4), (5). See the text for details.
6. Conclusions
This article analyses value changes of stock market companies in response
to exchange rate movements, with special focus on exposure of the German
stock market in the face of variations of the US dollar. Due to its high in-
volvement in international trade, the German case should be very well suited
for testing the presence of currency exposure. The approach followed in this
work extends the standard way of measuring exchange rate exposure in sev-
eral ways (e.g. by using multi-factor modelling instead of augmented CAPM,
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application of moving window panel regressions, orthogonalization of overall
market risk vis-à-vis currency risk), but the main innovation lies in testing im-
plications of exchange rate adjustment costs for firm values and exposure.
This issue is important, as reducing currency risks by implementing hedging
strategies like use of forward contracts or options is costly, and costs in-
crease with rising distance to benchmark values, which we test to be related
to long-run expectations.
Based on time series data for German DAX companies, DM/dollar rates and
macroeconomic factors, we find a rather unstable, time-variant exposure of
German stock market companies. Linking estimated exposure to German
trade, we arrive at results in line with previous outcomes known from the lit-
erature. We may conclude that in general (on average), German exposure is
well described through the role of a net exporter, who benefits from the de-
preciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estimations of time-varying ex-
posure based on dollar risks have a positive sign with exception of the first
half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a strong
US Dollar changed the situation.
Our results confirm the hypothesis of significant adjustment costs. Estimates
are in accordance with long-run mean (median) reversion and asymmetric
adjustment costs. Deviations of exchange rates from their long-run values
have a significant impact on exposure. We find that the larger is the distance
of current exchange rates from their long-median, the lower are company val-
ues. Moreover, there is evidence that impact curves are nonlinear and
asymmetric. Following arguments of Koutmos and Martin (2003), who reason
that exporting firms may be inclined to hedge mainly against domestic cur-
rency appreciations (yet remain unhedged against domestic currency depre-
ciations), whereas importers may be inclined to hedge domestic currency de-
preciations (yet remain unhedged against domestic currency appreciations),
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our results indicate that German exporters were more successful in curbing
losses from strong appreciations than importers in cutting losses from sub-
stantial depreciations.
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Table C: Exchange Rate Exposure of German DAX companies
Company 1977-1995 1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995
ALLIANZ AG 0.032 -0.182 -0.379* 0.011 0.226
BASF AG 0.076 0.150 -0.242* 0.089 0.283*
BAYER AG 0.034 0.049 -0.254** 0.051 0.190
BMW AG 0.197* -0.154 -0.153 0.318 0.452*
BAYER. VEREINS-
BANK AG
0.094 0.006 -0.328** 0.271 0.148
COMMERZBANK AG 0.058 0.128 -0.589** 0.540** -0.023
CONTINENTAL AG 0.135 -0.240 -0.310 0.442 0.260
DAIMLER-BENZ AG 0.278** 0.032 -0.333** 0.559** 0.612**
DEGUSSA AG 0.368** 0.215 -0.236 0.738** 0.632**
DEUTSCHE BANK
AG
0.153* 0.065 -0.400** 0.580** 0.139
DRESDNER BANK
AG
-0.046 0.224* -0.681** 0.225 0.012
DEUTSCHE BAB-
COCK AG
0.190 0.029 -0.363 0.659** 0.361
HOECHST AG 0.024 0.030 -0.352** 0.001 0.383**
BAYER. HYPO-
THEKEN- UND
WECHSELBANK AG
0.144 0.080 -0.338* 0.481** 0.063
KARSTADT AG 0.202 0.259 -0.351 0.347 0.577**
KAUFHOF AG 0.232* 0.283 -0.340* 0.529* 0.402*
LINDE AG 0.158* -0.132 -0.255 0.210 0.471**
LUFTHANSA AG 0.191 0.171 0.149 0.101 0.144
MAN AG 0.123 -0.217 -0.459** 0.118 0.879**
MANNESMANN AG 0.144 0.057 -0.397** 0.276 0.517**
METALLGESELL-
SCHAFT AG
0.132 -0.009 -0.223 -0.049 0.601
PREUSSAG AG 0.427* -0.064 -0.099 0.538 0.793**
RWE AG 0.031 0.040 -0.270* 0.085 0.190
SCHERING AG 0.163 0.389 -0.219 0.134 0.270
SIEMENS AG 0.223* 0.212* -0.264** 0.435** 0.329**
THYSSEN AG 0.198 0.376 -0.208 0.162 0.650**
VEBA AG -0.009 0.036 -0.407** 0.197 0.028
VOLKSWAGEN AG 0.067 -0.242 -0.353 0.298 0.094
Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)).
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Table D: Market Betas (overall market risk)
Company 1977-1995 1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995
ALLIANZ AG 1.316 1.150 1.439 1.280 1.301
BASF AG 0.864 0.706 0.936 0.836 1.123
BAYER AG 0.876 1.046 1.020 0.872 0.881
BMW AG 1.193 1.544 1.048 1.316 1.253
BAYER. VEREINS-
BANK AG
1.044 1.078 0.868 1.104 1.002
COMMERZBANK AG 1.111 1.070 1.529 0.972 0.929
CONTINENTAL AG 0.922 1.313 1.196 0.780 0.800
DAIMLER-BENZ AG 1.341 1.027 1.299 1.310 1.333
DEGUSSA AG 0.945 0.912 0.969 0.860 1.222
DEUTSCHE BANK
AG
1.159 0.945 1.363 1.060 1.028
DRESDNER BANK
AG
1.166 0.786 1.470 1.139 0.907
DEUTSCHE BAB-
COCK AG
1.090 0.981 1.207 1.014 1.580
HOECHST AG 0.862 0.843 0.995 0.764 1.170
BAYER. HYPO-
THEKEN- UND
WECHSELBANK AG
1.097 0.911 1.015 1.119 1.033
KARSTADT AG 0.858 1.035 0.660 0.984 0.875
KAUFHOF AG 0.951 1.404 0.732 0.901 1.490
LINDE AG 1.008 1.338 0.990 0.980 1.192
LUFTHANSA AG 0.934 1.075 0.711 1.070 1.048
MAN AG 1.129 1.366 1.175 1.098 1.204
MANNESMANN AG 1.181 1.336 1.081 1.133 1.338
METALLGESELL-
SCHAFT AG
1.174 1.683 0.844 1.280 1.645
PREUSSAG AG 1.108 1.388 0.958 1.140 1.116
RWE AG 0.785 0.688 0.614 0.830 1.021
SCHERING AG 0.967 1.203 1.137 0.953 0.833
SIEMENS AG 1.177 1.007 1.217 1.194 1.066
THYSSEN AG 1.028 1.174 1.134 1.005 1.263
VEBA AG 0.810 0.757 0.744 0.811 0.932
VOLKSWAGEN AG 1.277 1.869 1.332 1.307 1.351
Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)).
